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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case, as was stated in Appellants initial 
Statement of the Case. It involves errors made by the trial court 
in reviewing and modifying Appellant's alimony obligation to 
Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No additional facts need be set forth in connection with this 
Reply Brief, other than to mention that the child support which Dr. 
Gerber originally agreed to pay was in excess of that provided for 
under the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines (R-158). Appellant 
relies on the Statement of Facts set forth in his principal brief 
on pages 4 through 15. 
With regard to the relief being requested by Dr. Gerber, Mrs. 
Gerber continuously attempts to characterize it as Dr. Gerber's 
attempt to terminate his alimony obligation entirely. Perhaps that 
was done in order to engender some sympathy from this Court for 
Mrs. Gerber. Regardless of her motive, it is important for this 
Court to understand that Dr. Gerber' s position on the alimony issue 
is simple and consistent with Utah law on alimony awards - If Mrs. 
Gerber is capable of earning $4,000 per month as a dental hygienist 
then Dr. Gerber ought not to have to pay her $4,000 per month in 
alimony. If she can only make $3,000 per month, working part time 
as a dental hygienist, then Dr Gerber's alimony obligation should 
be reduced by the amount of income she is able to produce for 
herself. This is what Dr. Gerber's position was when this matter 
was tried and is also what his position is now. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DR. GERBER HAS FULFILLED ALL REQUIREMENTS 
NECESSARY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN THE WAY IT DEALT WITH THE ALIMONY 
ISSUE 
Mrs. Gerber argues in Point I of her brief that Dr. Gerber has 
failed to meet the marshalling of the evidence requirement which 
this Court has stated is necessary in order to challenge Findings 
of Fact on appeal in divorce actions. [(Peterson v. Peterson, 818 
P.2d 1305, 1308 (utah App. 1591)] 
That is simply not true. Dr. Gerber, throughout his brief has 
meticulously referred this Court to all portions of the record (the 
court file, the testimony and the exhibits) , to support his claims 
of error and demonstrate that the trial court arbitrarily ignored 
undisputed evidence which should have been considered in connection 
with Dr. Gerber's request to reduce his alimony obligation. 
On the other hand, Mrs. Gerber1s brief is seriously lacking in 
references to the record other than reference to the court file. 
Her only reference to testimony and exhibits can be found on page 
18 of her brief in support of her claim that there was ample 
evidence to support each of the trial court's findings. Her 
argument related to Dr. Gerber's failure to Marshall the evidence 
is but an attempt to distract this Court from the real issues 
raised by this appeal. 
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The parties original settlement agreement, as reflected in 
paragraph 3 of the Decree, provided as follows: 
Defendant is awarded alimony from plaintiff in the sum of 
$4,000 a month commencing with the month of July 1993, 
based upon the current financial circumstances of the 
parties as shown in their Financial Declarations and 
under circumstances where defendant is currently unable 
to work based upon her present physical disability. 
There shall be an automatic review of this alimony award 
in one year from the date of the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce, or earlier if circumstances warrant, based upon 
the anticivation that defendant will use her best efforts 
to seek and obtain employment at the highest economic 
level and will, further, use her best efforts to 
rehabilitate herself from her disability to held her 
achieve her best employment opportunities. 
The issue is reserved as to whether defendant's 
employment should be full or part-time balked upon the 
needs of the children. At the time of the review, each 
party shall have the right to express his or her 
respective position on this issue, as plaintiff' s 
position is that defendant should seek and obtain full 
time employment and defendant's position is that she 
should seek and obtain part time employment due to the 
children1s needs. 
Plaintiff shall have the right to request defendant to 
obtain a physical examination by a hand expert currently, 
with a further examination six months from the entry of 
the Decree of Divorce and a second further examination 
one year from the entry of the Decree of Divorce to 
assist the Court in determining defendant's ability to 
obtain employment. 
At the time of the review by the Court, if there has been 
a substantial change in financial circumstances or 
ability, then the Court may make adjustments in the 
alimony award based upon those changes. (R-76) (Emphasis 
added) 
This paragraph contains two factors which were to be 
considered when the alimony award was reviewed. The first was a 
requirement on the part of Mrs. Gerber to use her best efforts to 
seek and obtain employment at the highest economical level and use 
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her best efforts to rehabilitate herself from her disability to 
help her achieve her best employment oppoxtunities: (R 76; Emphasis 
added) 
The second factoi was whet'.e: .,r n ^ :v -^—.--"J i -;crk full or 
pari" i i,HIP br- : , u m e needs ot Lhe "'"• ^  -K~-
The trial court erred in focusing n 
the second factor and totally overlooking Mrs, Gerber"s legal 
obi igat '< • ' •" " -ntial. 
Dr. Gerber does n. M_ taiie I S S U V w . \b the Court" s finding that 
Mrs, Gerber .^hou'-i ••vor-- only part time 32 hoi irs per. week), but he 
doe s I a ke : •. • • 11: :i a 1 < ::oi 1 1 t: :i gnore d t he 
following undisputed evidence; 
2) Mrs. Gerber could earn $3,000 to $4,000 per' month as a 
dental, hygienist, depending mi wheLhei vlit> worked f 11 I I < 
(40 versus 32 hours per week). (R-272--374) 
2)
 W o r ] ^ w a s available £ o r M r s _ Gerber as a dental hygienist. 
(R- 2 74) 
3) Mrs, Gerber had applied for only one job since the Decree 
) 
4) Mrs. Gerber applied to recertify as a dental hygienist 
only after Dr.. Gerber filed his Petition to Modify, (R-370) 
5) 1 4i: s Gerber missed pa.ssi.nq 1" lie rest by on I y two points, 
(R 412) and was at best reluctant to take it: again. (R7412) 
6) Mr? Gr^hei" said she would not have the relatively minor, 
uiii palienf k-d surgery T I. n "or. root. Hie probl em« wi i.h \\t-n 
hand. (R-263) 
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7) Mrs. Gerber, in her own opinion, was no longer disabled. 
(R-403) 
8) Mrs. Gerber was working 4 full days per week as a 
substitute teacher. (R-413) 
9) Mrs. Gerber could earn five to six times more working 
part time as a dental hygienist as opposed to a substitute teacher. 
($25 per hour vs. $5.67 per hour) (R-402, 403) 
10) Mrs. Gerber did not want to be a dental hygienist. 
(R-4~2) 
In order to fully deal with the issues before it, Judge 
Cornaby should have found that Mrs. Gerber had not maximized her 
earning potential as she had agreed and been ordered to do. By not 
so doing, he erred and fashioned a remedy that was unfairly 
beneficial to Mrs. Gerber and patently unfair to Dr. Gerber. The 
evidence before him required him to find that Mrs. Gerber was 
capable of earning at least $3,440 per month ($25 per hour x 32 
hours per week x 4.3 weeks per month), rather than the $700 per 
month she was making as a substitute teacher and in so finding, he 
then would have been required to reduce Mrs. Gerber's alimony award 
by at least the amount she was capable of earning. 
Dr. Gerber has demonstrated without question that the trial 
court failed to make appropriate findings on a material issue in 
the case, and had it done so, the evidence presented would have 
required an immediate reduction in Dr. Gerber's alimony obligation 
far greater than the deferred minor adjustment the trial court 
erroneously made. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT A 
MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES HAD OCCURRED 
SO AS TO IMMEDIATELY REDUCE DR. GERBER'S 
ALIMONY OBLIGATION BY AT LEAST $1,3 63/MONTH 
Points II arid I I J of Mrs, Gerberfs Briei unsuccessful] y 
attempt no respond to Point II of Dr. Gerber' s Brief regarding the 
t - i.' '" disregard <A tdie fact that Mrs. Gerber! s 
ror'-.h1 . ;*c:omf nad .•: gnif icantly increased and her monthly expenses 
had significantly decreased since the entry of the original decree. 
She argues U1..1L hm i note a si,1 J n month.I y i nconie '< - 'nrki nq part 
time, to $1,000 per month is not significant, She does not even 
address the fact that, by tier own evidence, her monthly expenses 
had decreased by :p I , 2'iu pei month. (See page 32 1! Appellant". '" s 
Br;ei" Jnder no stref d: of the imuoiriatn.n • .:. a 0 ,s JU per month 
1 .- • income and expenses be deemed not sui"{"ir/ :i -;• material 
; or purposes ^f modify! nq an alimony award,
 t . .her A/ciy, 
it Berber's ..1.":-^  had decreased by , p- r a ;-nth and her 
- A. .. - • -u siie have a 
justifiable basis t<_ . '-•^•r, -\ 1 i.ici-as-. . .. ,.^ony award? The 
anr-'w*-1- *o thjt o>-3~": n • i .^' ur^qu 1 vocdJ y s . Likewise, based 
- - -' ' ' : * - , ' • * > : i • u s t i f i e d 
na,:is : or request, ^ nj leli^r !/•.,. ;.. - Z-t , • p^_ . n , alimony 
ob"l igat ion when iris former spouse:-- income had increased $1,000 per 
••:,•.:;-;.— : : ..sod upon 
ne:' own e v i d e n c e . 
M i s . oo^-^^-v
 r. ] a r : ^ « a r e a t weight" ' '^s 1 f a p p e a r s ?*h*- t r i a l com;; : 
o n t . . - . • • i , .* 
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Gerber must work over 80 hours per week to earn that monthly 
figure. Mrs. Gerber argues that a $6,100 per month support award is 
insignificant in comparison to the amount of money Dr. Gerber has 
left for himself. She claims Dr. Gerber has the sum of $10,566 
left for himself each month. It appears that Judge Cornaby felt 
the same way. 
In reality however, the following more accurately demonstrates 
what Dr. Gerber actually has left each month and the injustice of 
the current support award: 
Dr. Gerberfs gross monthly 
income $16,666 
Alimony payment (4,000) 
Net monthly income before 
taxes 12,666 
Federal and State combined tax 
[38% (Low estimate)] (4,813) 
Net monthly income after tax 7,853 
Child support payment (2,100) 
Dr. Gerber's net take home 
after estimated taxes and 
payment of support obligations $ 5,753 
As can be seen, Dr. Gerber presently pays over halt of his net 
income to meet his child support and alimony obligations working 80 
hours per week. For Mrs. Gerber to suggest that a $1,0 00 per month 
increase in her income is not significant nor material and to 
simply ignore a $1,200 per month reduction in her monthly expenses 
is cavalier at beat. 
The undisputed changes in circumstances which occurred since 
the entry of the Decree and which Judge Cornaby erroneously ignored 
are as follows: 
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1) p-"- Gerber! a monf income upon whicl 1 tl: ie ox igi na] 
support obligations w* ro based remained unchanged. 
2) ) c 
3) Mi:] -.^iber s montniy expenses decreaseo :y *. per 
month. 
Tt was an a.. 
that -;hese changes n t. he parties, financial condition were not 
mater--' - •-• d so give - Berber relief from him monthly alimony 
obligation by at leas*" .3. 
POINT III 
THIS APFE, -*' -;.n;<: ,^L i;; AWARD JF 
ATTORNEY1 S FE^, ; ,/ ,, ^L>. GERBER 
APPROPRIATE 
\: t-tnp conr* I • i ^  i o. of her Brief Mrs G;. .'Lei cia in;:;: that Dr. 
"frivolous'. -uva -ss ;•.,- ;; :a-_ she be a^vdrc^d ; - * attorneys fees •^••\ 
apceal . " l':"Y'' o""] .ci:s" s defined Webster ' s Ninth New College 
Dictionary . . ...;..::•;. 
The issues raiseu cy ui. . Gerber in chis appeal are substantial 
•:•• ! oi verv r;--' . "oorcance not oniy LG •" - -^  H^- - * ?! =o t--• ^  i I 
iiiiividualo ^ n may be payina a :.-.-• 
voluntarily underemployed. FuriG ei
 ; u: awa. < • alimony whi.::r 
reaa': -oaause receiving between "' ; ^ * ';^-1 $:y .'60 per month 
mere i^ ^^ .-.e i"han what her month...', •. -... o_a... ;••-eos e -
established ty iv n a.-- figures, is certain^., significant r.a Lr 
•>•• \"i;'--' • ; < -•. r . er weej^ iu meet 
his aisuoiiy --t;'i-:.i .•.;;!,, support wb; iyaLiohb o.' CL , .-.'. ' o e r m o n t h . 
This Court has specifically formulated the standard to be 
applied when determining whether or not an appeal is "frivolous". 
In Hinklev v. Hinklev, 815 P.2d 1352, (Utah App. 1991), Judge 
Russon, in writing for a unanimous panel on an appeal of a 
modification award, denied a wife's request for fees on appeal 
based upon a claim of frivolousness and stated: 
. . . this court has previously held that 'sanctions for 
frivolous appeals should only be applied in egregious 
cases, lest there be an improper chilling of the right to 
appeal erroneous lower court decisions., Porco v. Porco, 
152 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988). Utah R.App.P.33 (b) 
defines a frivolous appeal as none that is not grounded 
in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on 
a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse 
existing law." The appeal in this case is not frivolous 
inasmuch as both the change in circumstances claim and 
the waiver claim had some merit and a reasonable legal 
basis. Therefore we decline to award attorney's fees and 
costs on appeal. Id. at 1355, 56 
In this case, Dr. Gerber has certainly met the minimum burden 
of demonstrating that the legal issues he has raised on appeal have 
merit and a reasonable legal basis". 
Moreover, he has demonstrated that Judge Cornaby ignored 
undisputed evidence that Mrs. Gerber was voluntarily underemployed 
and was receiving support monies well in excess of her own 
statement of financial need. 
If anything, Dr. Gerber should be awarded the attorneys fees 
he has been required to incur in asking this court to rectify the 
trial courts errors so that he likewise will be treated fairly. 
Mrs. Gerberfs request for fees on appeal should be denied. 
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CONCLUSION 
Simply put, .Judge Cornaby was wrong - s . j . -^ dealt villi 
Dr . Gerber ' s r eq iiest to i: ee v a] i late ' ; ^ te Lfie 
original alimony award That award w«^ premised _ L„ .t t-hat 
1 1 i : : • Gerber had specifi ca/11^ agreed ^^> VP^T ^ .-srlier "ha: she would 
rehabilitate herself and _,_ 
as a d<\-ital hygien.r" n. I would earn ,**,*• ,^.b, „ per year. 
In _i uhen be able tc "Urnr-- n^r^f^ - -arid orovin> 
Dr. Gerber w.. _i .- , mu^h needed l:u . . 
alimony award was premised on tf igreemeut :
 ; nei - Sne 
" V'I mil r.u i I \/ elected not, I in.ix i ni.i ze - -* ecuming r^~:en^ i -
material element of the parties, original Settlement Agreement, and 
she now wants all ol the benefits of tha' original agreement: 
1
 y/iUnu.H n,ii, IM IIJ.IKJ hei par!, I t lie bargain. 
In considering Dro Gerber's request for relief, he 
respectfully asks each member of this Court to put himself/herself 
in Dr. Gerber ' s posi I. ion i<jt .i momonl . \>\ftc\\ month he A/orks over 
34 4 hours. Each month he is required to write a check for $6,100 
I'"n tf'::Jl'ircfy his support obligations, WhiJe writing this check, he 
knows that his former spouse, a trained dental hycienlst ini 
capable of making $36,000 to $48,000 per y-axy has voluntarily 
chosen i \.;>i r. , p\ \ r s11e t• hat career. She has i nstead chosen to pursue 
a more leisurely lifestyle, electing I.:«J work pari I i"::r .ind earn 
only $5,76 per hour rather than the $25. Qo per hour she could earn 
ay a dentd [ Liygienist: , She justifies her choice to work only part 
time with the pretense of being able to t$nd to the extracurricular 
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needs of the parties, three children, aged 15, 13 and 11. One can 
only conclude that Mrs. Gerberfs real reason for not working to her 
full capacity is that she does not want to. The monies Dr. Gerber 
currently pays her are more than adequate to meet her monthly 
expenses and allow her to remain underemployed. It is not fair to 
require Dr. Gerber to shoulder all of the financial 
responsibilities of the parties when the record is clear that 
Mrs. Gerber has the ability and the duty to assist in the financial 
support of herself as much as she can. 
The duty of a trial court in divorce actions is to fashion 
remedies fair and equitable to both parties. In this case, Judge 
Cornaby did not correctly fulfill that duty. The remedy he 
fashioned was patently unfair to Dr. Gerber given the undisputed 
evidence before him. Dr. Gerber respectfully asks this Court to 
remedy the error committed by the trial court and grant the relief 
requested on page 15 of his Brief. 
Respectfully submitted this day of August, 1996 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
By:< r^N^ctvv^ -{^**4nHo>~~~ 
^ o < A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l a n t 
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